We examine forces for the descriptive representation of women in ministerial and sub-ministerial positions. We offer a unified model in which portfolio allocation makes political forces for descriptive representation more important in the case of ministerial lines; in contrast, labor market...

We examine data from a laboratory test in which pairs of subjects are given the task of negotiating a wage-labor agreement. We find limited evidence for gender differences in the content of wage agreements and differences in trusting behavior

We describe a simple mechanism for achieving two goals: (1) to encourage firms to take environmentally friendly action, and (2) to make environmental protection regime-proof. We assert that there is wide evidence now that firms adopting an environmental management system (EMS) like ISO 14001...

We examine how a principal implements a joint forcing contract for a team of two agents, whose joint product determines the value of the principal's asset. We focus on the "agents' problem": whether to contribute to a public good when one's costly contribution is unobservable. Our experiments...

Numerous studies argue that law affects behavior "expressively" - such as when states create focal points that overcome the coordination difficulties firms face. We argue that governments help firms overcome coordination dilemmas when they explicate a preferred strategy for firms weighing...

How does the informational role of interest groups interact with institutions in the political control of the bureaucracy? In 1992, Banks and Weingast argued that bureaucrats hold an informational advantage vis-a-vis political principals concerning variables with direct policy relevance, and...

The central question in modern regulatory states is how to balance the sword of public enforcement with the setting of incentives for firms to comply with the law - broadly, to pursue the public good - just because it is in their interest to do so. We assess the ability of the state to encourage...

In this paper I describe the effects on authority when organizations shift from product-line to matrix structures. My method of analysis is based on how political scientists study agendas in committees. I first recount that moving from a functional to a product-line structure increases the types...

Like the first-mover in an ultimatum game, the principal is a first-mover with foreknowledge of the agent’s “rational” best response function. The solution to the “principal’s problem” is to choose a contract that maximizes the principal’s expected profit given the agent’s...

Does aggregate ideological extremism reduce public participation? Does participation in governance processes fall when the social environment shifts to the extreme left or the extreme right of the political spectrum? Our main hypothesis is that the aggregate ideological orientation of the social...