Consider a finite, normal form game G in which each player position is occupied by a population of N individuals, and the payoff to any given individual is the expected payoff from playing against a group drawn at random from the other positions.  Assume that individuals adjust their behavior...

In 1995, Aumann showed that in games of perfect information, common knowledge of rationality is consistent and entails the back- ward induction (BI) outcome. That work has been criticized because it uses "counterfactual" reasoning|what a player "would" do if he reached a node that he knows he...

We propose a simple adaptive procedure for playing strategic games: average testing. In this procedure each player sticks to her current strategy if it yields a payoff that exceeds her average payoff by at least some fixed \epsilon 0; otherwise she chooses a strategy at random. We consider...

Define a continuous game to be one in which every player's strategy set is a Polish space, and the payoff function of each player is bounded and continuous. We prove that in this class of games the process of sequentially eliminating "never-best-reply" strategies terminates before or at the...

The logic of backward induction (BI) in perfect information (PI) games has been intensely scrutinized for the past quarter century. A major development came in 2002, when P. Battigalli and M. Sinischalchi (BS) showed that an outcome of a PI game is consistent with common strong belief of utility...

Infinite sequential games, in which Nature chooses a Borel winning set and reveals it to one of the players, do not necessarily have a value if Nature has 3 or more choices. The value does exist if Nature has 2 choices. The value also does not necessarily exist if Nature chooses from 2 Borel...