Consider a setting where many individuals make predictions over the (unknown) state of nature based on signals they receive independently. An outside Bayesian observer, familiar with the common prior shared by the individuals, can aggregate this information and identify correctly the actual...

We study a delegation problem within a Bayesian persuasion framework with the aim of understanding the incentive design of representatives. We are doing so by adding a preplay stage to the standard Bayesian persuasion model in which the receiver is allowed to choose a representative in order to...

We study a canonical setting of learning in networks where initially agents receive conditionally i.i.d. signals about a binary state. The distribution according to which signals are drawn is called an information structure. Agents repeatedly communicate beliefs with their neighbors and update...

Two firms produce substitute goods with unknown quality. At each stage the firms set prices and a consumer with private information and unit demand buys from one of the firms. Both firms and consumers see the entire history of prices and purchases. Will such markets aggregate information? Will...

This paper provides a model of social learning where the order in which actions are taken is determined by an m-dimensional integer lattice rather than along a line as in the herding model. The observation structure is determined by a random network. Every agent links to each of his preceding...

We analyze boundedly rational updating in a repeated interaction network model with binary actions and binary states. Agents form beliefs according to discretized DeGroot updating and apply a decision rule that assigns a (mixed) action to each belief. We first show that under weak assumptions...

We study a duopoly where the two price setting firms have symmetric information. The firms produce substitute goods with a state dependent common value. The information that is available to both firms about the unknown state of nature is also available to the consumers, who also have access to...

We study a monopolist that uses the following scheme to gauge market traction for its common-value, excludible product. The monopolist offers its product at a given price, and each potential consumer decides whether to buy it. The contributions are collected. The product is supplied only if the...