Theoretically, this work relaxes the rationality behind IESDS in the normal-form game and Backward Induction in the … extensive-form game, namely common p-believe in rationality in the normal-form game and common p-belief in the opponent’s future … rationality in the extensive-form game. Exper- imentally, this work uses the experimental data from Masaki, Guillaume, and Sevgi …

characterizes common certainty of rationality in the universal type space. …

I study the evolution of rationality, using an indirect evolutionary approach, in which nature selects a decision …-making procedure, and the procedure chooses actions in matching-games. The main result is that in order for (knowledge of) rationality …

When evaluating the rationality of a player in an epistemic model of a noncooperative game one has to examine … deviation actually occurs. I show that, in this extended model, common knowledge of rationality need not lead to … rationalizability. I also present assumptions that allow rationalizability to be a consequence of common knowledge of rationality in …

The literary source of the main ideas in Aumann's article "Backward Induction and Common Knowledge of Rationality" is …