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Chapman, Bruce - 2008

given problem is framed. Thus, real world agents are only, it is said, capable of a bounded rationality, using rules of … thumb and various heuristics (sometimes helpful, sometimes not) rather than the fully fledged maximizing rationality that is … normative account of rationality that animates rational choice theory, and not just the positive account that is criticized by …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014114843

Social Rationalizability with Mediation

Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, … - 2022

the consequences of common knowledge of rationality and farsightedness. In a social environment several coalitions may and … show that social rationalizability with mediation does not necessarily satisfy coalitional rationality when the number of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013306878

The value of technology improvements in games with externalities : a fresh look at offsetting behavior

Hoy, Michael; Polborn, Mattias - 2014

How should we evaluate the welfare implications of improvements to safety technologies in the presence of offsetting behavior? We model this problem as a symmetric game in which each player's payoff depends on his own action and the average action of the other players, and analyze under which...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010354804

Monitoring institutions in indefinitely repeated games

Camera, Gabriele; Casari, Marco - 2015

Does monitoring past conduct facilitate intertemporal cooperation? We designed an experiment characterized by strategic uncertainty and multiple equilibria where coordinating on the efficient outcome is a challenge. Participants, interacting anonymously in a group, could pay a cost either to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011713674

Social context and the spread of HIV : an evolutionary game-theoretic investigation on the impacts of social stigma on epidemic outcomes

Ferguson, William D.; Nguyen, Trang Kieu - In: Economies : open access journal 2 (2014) 3, pp. 171-192

We provide a theoretical foundation for analyzing how social stigma and adopted behavioral traits affect the transmission of HIV across a population. We combine an evolutionary game-theoretic model-based on a relationship signaling stage game-with the SIR (susceptible-infected-recovered) model...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010434137

Bayesian games with unawareness and unawareness perfection

Meier, Martin; Schipper, Burkhard - 2012

Applying unawareness belief structures introduced in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2012), we develop Bayesian games with unawareness, define equilibrium, and prove existence. We show how equilibria are extended naturally from lower to higher awareness levels and restricted from higher to lower...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009544158

Finite depth of reasoning and equilibrium play in games with incomplete information

Kets, Willemien - 2013

The standard framework for analyzing games with incomplete information models players as if they have an infinite depth of reasoning, which is not always consistent with experimental evidence. This paper generalizes the type spaces of Harsanyi (1967-1968) so that players can have a finite depth...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009782099

Unawareness, beliefs and games

Heifetz, Aviad; Meier, Martin; Schipper, Burkhard - 2007

We define a generalized state-space model with interactive unawareness and probabilistic beliefs. Such models are desirable for many potential applications of asymmetric unawareness. We develop Bayesian games with unawareness, define equilibrium, and prove existence. We show how equilibria are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365853

Robust multiplicity with a grain of naiveté

Heifetz, Aviad; Kets, Willemien - 2013

In an important paper, Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) show that if players have an infinite depth of reasoning and this is commonly believed, types generically have a unique rationalizable action in games that satisfy a richness condition. We show that this result does not extend to environments...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010221860

Bayesian games with unawareness and unawareness perfection

Meier, Martin; Schipper, Burkhard - 2013

Applying unawareness belief structures introduced in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2013a), we develop Bayesian games with unawareness, define equilibrium, and prove existence. We show how equilibria are extended naturally from lower to higher awareness levels and restricted from higher to lower...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010240317