We experimentally study how redistribution choices are affected by positive and negative information regarding the behaviour of a previous participant in a dictator game with a taking option. We use the strategy method to identify behavioural ‘types', and thus distinguish ‘conformists' from...

The standard framework for analyzing games with incomplete information models players as if they have an infinite depth of reasoning, which is not always consistent with experimental evidence. This paper generalizes the type spaces of Harsanyi (1967-1968) so that players can have a finite depth...

Purpose - The current paper is a brief review of the emerging field of quantum-like modelling in game theory. This paper aims to explore several quantum games, which are superior compared to their classical counterparts, which means either they give rise to superior Nash equilibria or they make...

Does monitoring past conduct facilitate intertemporal cooperation? We designed an experiment characterized by strategic uncertainty and multiple equilibria where coordinating on the efficient outcome is a challenge. Participants, interacting anonymously in a group, could pay a cost either to...

This study discusses the convergence to a solution in simultaneous-move games with unawareness. Since games with unawareness assume players' unawareness of actions, in some plays, players might revise their subjective views when they observe opponents' play, which they were unaware of. Recently,...

We run a laboratory experiment to investigate how the size of the group affects coordination in a bank-run game played repeatedly by participants facing different fellow depositors. For comparability purposes, we keep the coordination tightness constant across different sizes. Participants...

Unternehmen können von einer effektiven Bewirtschaftung ihrer Daten sowie vom Datenteilen mit anderen Unternehmen profitieren. Datenempfänger können die Daten beispielsweise für Produkt- oder Prozessoptimierungen nutzen und Datengeber können ein Entgelt erhalten. Allerdings erfolgt die...

Applying unawareness belief structures introduced in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2012), we develop Bayesian games with unawareness, define equilibrium, and prove existence. We show how equilibria are extended naturally from lower to higher awareness levels and restricted from higher to lower...

I model people in a coordination game who use a communication network to tell each other their willingness to participate. The minimal sufficient networks for coordination can be interpreted as placing people into ahierarchy of social roles or "stages": "initial adopters", then "followers", and...

We study (interim correlated) rationalizability in a game with incomplete information. We characterize the recursive set of possible rationalizable hierarchies through a finite automaton and provide a revelation principle that characterizes the distributions over these hierarchies that arise...