In a domestic market, a duopoly produces a homogeneous final good, pollution, pollution abatement, and R&D, which reduces abatement cost. One of the firms (foreign) has superior technology. The government regulates the duopoly by levying a pollution tax to maximize domestic welfare. We consider...

This paper presents an examination of the socially efficient formation of environmental R&D in Cournot duopoly in a setting where a regulator has no precommitment ability for an emission tax. The results reveal that if the environmental damage is slight, alternatively, given severe environmental...

This paper presents an examination of the socially efficient formation of environmental R&D in Cournot duopoly in a setting where a regulator has no precommitment ability for an emission tax. The results reveal that if the environmental damage is slight, alternatively, given severe environmental...

We consider a setting where firms undertake emission-reducing R&D and the regulator, who sets the emission tax, is unable to commit credibly. Firms are subject to research spillovers in emission reduction. We examine two regimes with respect to the organization of R&D: independent R&D and an...

[ENGLISH] This paper reviews the theoretical literature concerning the welfare effects of research joint ventures. The analysis pays attention to both the most debated questions and the topics not yet covered in the literature. The study suggests the existence of two main streams: one positive,...

This paper reviews the theoretical literature concerning the welfare effects of Research Joint Ventures. The analysis pays attention on both the most debated questions and the topics not yet covered in the literature. The study suggests the existence of two main streams: one positive, the other...

This paper considers cost-reducing R&D investment with spillovers in a Cournot oligopoly with minority shareholdings. We find that, with high market concentration and sufficiently convex demand, there is no scope for cross-ownership to improve welfare regardless of spillover levels. Otherwise,...

In a domestic market, a duopoly produces a homogeneous final good, pollution, pollution abatement and R&D. One of the firms (foreign) has superior technology. The government regulates the duopoly by levying a pollution tax to maximize domestic welfare. We consider the potential implementation of...

We show that the presumed incompatibility of R&D and competition in Spence (1984) is not fundamental, but hinges on a critical modeling choice. Specifically, we show that for a widely used class of R&D technology, that is, the functional form mapping R&D effort into cost reduction, the...