Patent settlements between rivals restrain competition in many different ways. Antitrust requires that their anticompetitive effects are reasonably commensurate with the firms’ expectations about (counterfactual) patent litigation. Because these expectations are private and non-verifiable,...

Common ownership fundamentally upsets the well-settled merger enforcement ecosystem. Not only it challenges basic principles informing merger policy such as the presumed profitability of mergers for the merging firms and the merger-specificity of potential efficiencies but also it works against...

Partial ownership of stock in multiple competing firms is an important scholarly and policy topic in both corporate and antitrust law. Until now, the discussion has focused on ownership. This essay shifts the debate from a focus on common ownership to a focus on common control. No prior work has...

This paper gives a fresh account of competition in the digital economy. Economic analysis in the field of industrial organization remains largely focused on a sophisticated version of the Schumpeter-Arrow debate, which is unresolved and largely irrelevant. We posit the need to look at...

On behalf of 65 professors, this brief supports the student-athletes in NCAA v. Alston. The brief has three main points.First, the Petitioners (the NCAA and athletics conferences) seek to unwind a century of antitrust law by obtaining immunity for anticompetitive conduct. The NCAA, alone among...

Pharmaceutical markets are complex. Multiple agents, including doctors, insurers, and pharmacies, play critical roles that affect competition between manufacturers and patient choice between drugs. This complexity, however, is neglected in standard antitrust analysis. In evaluating proposed...

Minority shareholdings have been on the regulatory agenda of competition authorities for some time. Recent empirical studies, however, draw attention to a new, thought provoking theory of harm: common ownership by institutional investors holding small, parallel equity positions in several...

Should internet era merger policy differ from industrial era merger policy? Platform ecosystems rely on economies of scale, data-driven economies of scope, high-quality algorithmic systems, and strong network effects that frequently promote winner-take-most markets. Their market dominance has...

Throughout the years, much intellectual energy has been invested into drawing the line between being anti-competitive by object or by effect, ignoring that an infringement must also be appreciable. Most likely based on a presumption that this is no longer a separate requirement, but part of...

Digital platforms facilitate interactions between consumers and merchants that allow collection of profiling information, which drives innovation and welfare. Private incentives, however, lead to information asymmetries resulting in market failures both on-platform, among merchants, and...