This paper analyses a model of electoral competition with lobbying, where candidates hold private information about … increase the effect of lobbying. If, however, the cost of running for office is sufficiently large, there is no effect of … lobbying on policy. The model thus demonstrates that uncertainty on the influence of special interests can lead to large …

We present a citizen-candidate model on a multidimensional policy space with lobbying, where citizens regard some … offset the effect of lobbying on the implemented policy. This result is in sharp contrast with previous work on … unidimensional citizen-candidate models that predict the irrelevance of lobbying on the implemented policy. In an extension of the …

what condition an interest group prefers to direct its lobbying efforts to two parties or the two coalition and opposition … discipline. The lobbying efforts under un-enforced and enforced party discipline are also compared. Finally, we clarify the … parties ; ideological predispositions ; electoral power ; post-elections lobbying ; enforced party discipline …

what condition an interest group prefers to direct its lobbying efforts to two parties or the two coalition and opposition … discipline. The lobbying efforts under un-enforced and enforced party discipline are also compared. Finally, we clarify the … parties ; ideological predispositions ; electoral power ; post-elections lobbying ; enforced party discipline …

what condition an interest group prefers to direct its lobbying efforts to two parties or the two coalition and opposition … discipline. The lobbying efforts under un-enforced and enforced party discipline are also compared. Finally, we clarify the …

condition an interest group prefers to direct its lobbying efforts to two parties or the two coalition and opposition blocks of … lobbying efforts under unenforced and enforced party discipline are also compared. Finally, we clarify the effect of …

with information (henceforth, inside lobbying) and grassroots mobilizations or advertising their position to voters … (henceforth, outside lobbying). How do these channels interact? I study a signaling model in which a politician chooses the scope … of a reform, two SIGs, one defending the status quo, the other pushing for change, use inside lobbying to bias the …

Using a model of repeated agency, we explain previously unexplained features of the real-world lobbying industry …. Lobbying is divided between direct representation by special interests to policymakers, and indirect representation where … analytical structure allows us to explain several trends in lobbying. For example, using the observation that in the U.S. over …