Regulatory theory assumes that national governments seek to constrain undesirable firm behavior, either through direct governmental oversight, or through oversight delegated to non-governmental organizations. We reverse that assumed relationship with the first study investigating when and how...

A substantial body of research in management and related public policy fields concludes that recent decades saw greater dynamic competition throughout technology-intensive ("TI") industries, with wide-spread, steady increase in TI industry and business performance instability as key...

We question previous research assuming that privatizing firm performance generally benefits from decreasing state ownership and the passage of time, both of which purportedly align principal-agent incentives promoting organizational decision-making that increases shareholder value. When state...

We re-examine foreign investment risk-mitigating effects of firm experience and equity stakes using an empirical context largely ignored by international business (IB) research: project investment companies (PICs). PICs permit cleaner separation of individual investment project risk from the...

Research in management and related fields largely assumes that host-country state (state) ownership in investment projects raises risk for private co-investors. We question that assumption in theorizing that minority state ownership may actually decrease investment risk in host countries where...

Research grounded in the behavioral theory of the firm (BTF) has elaborated on the role slack plays in supporting efforts to innovate in firms, but the BTF fails to account for moderating effects that national corporate governance institutions (NCGIs) may have on this firm-level relationship...

In developing countries, weak institutional capacity to observe and regulate the economy discourages foreign capital inflows vital to venture investment. This informality effect may differ for migrant remittances, inflows less reliant on formal arrangements. We use institutional and transaction...

We test competing theoretical perspectives explaining likely shareholder returns from material investment decisions announced by privatizing telecommunications firms ("telecoms") with varying levels of residual state ownership. A "principal-agent" perspective suggests that decrease in residual...