We focus on the question of why firms self-regulate to avoid more severe public regulation in the area of antitrust compliance. We distinguish the effects of an antitrust authority's outreach and enforcement on firms' adoption of antitrust compliance programs. Furthermore, we examine the...

A bonus on the fine in response to the defendant running a corporate compliance program is superfluous because working leniency programs provide all the incentives necessary to implement efficient compliance. Others opposed to such a bonus argue that unreduced fines are sufficient to incentivize...

We investigate the role of enforcement strategy in improving firms' compliance with corporate disclosure regulations. We find that a responsive enforcement strategy developed by the Australian corporate and financial markets regulator, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC),...

Finding common ground between corporate tax compliance and enforcement appears difficult and expensive, judging by the current inventory of almost $200 billion in proposed IRS transfer pricing tax adjustments, and projections of as much as $100 billion or more in annual U.S. federal corporate...

Compliance law theory is incomplete and in a conceptually disconnected state. This article seeks to offer clarification to this seemingly disparate yet growing and vitally important area of legal practice and scholarship. A robust theory of compliance that seeks to better explain and predict...

Is privacy a luxury for the rich world? Remarkably, there is a dearth of literature evaluating whether data privacy is too costly for companies to implement, or too expensive for governments to enforce. This paper is the first to offer a review of surveys of costs of compliance, and to summarize...