Showing 1 - 10 of 681,697
results suggest that over-reliance on elections to discipline politicians is misplaced …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012978149
results suggest that over-reliance on elections to discipline politicians is misplaced. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011594150
We model an election in which parties nominate candidates with observable policy preferences prior to a campaign that produces information about candidate quality, a characteristic independent of policy. Informative campaigns lead to greater differentiation in expected candidate quality, which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013081087
The literature on the rational PBC suggests that politicians systematically manipulate economic and fiscal conditions … before elections to increase their chances of eelection. Most tests of this theory look for evidence of pre …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014223422
Promises are prevalent in many competitive environments, but promise keeping is often difficult to observe. Do promises still offer an opportunity to honor future obligations, if promise keeping is unobservable? Focusing on campaign promises, we study the value of transparency. We showhow...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012830361
In their pursuit of being elected, politicians might not provide their constituents with independent viewpoints, but …, "candor", can be sustained as equilibria. This means that the public's trust or distrust in politicians may be self …-fulfilling prophecies. Importantly, the more informed politicians are about public opinion, the more likely it is that populist behavior can …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011584560
We construct a model in which an incumbent and a challenger decide whether to focus on policy or ability in electoral campaigning, and a media outlet then decides whether to gather news. We show that a candidate's strategy on which issue to focus on (i.e., campaign messages) can be a signal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012949300
It can be advantageous for an office motivated party A to spend effort to make it public that a group of voters will lose from party A s policy proposal. Such effort is called inverse campaigning. The inverse campaigning equilibria are described for the case where the two parties can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011507668
Previous research has established that good-looking political candidates win more votes. We extend this line of research by examining differences between parties on the left and on the right of the political spectrum. Our study combines data on personal votes in real elections with a web survey...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008808225
Since good-looking politicians win more votes, a beauty advantage for politicians on the left or on the right is bound … to have political consequences. We show that politicians on the right look more beautiful in Europe, the United States … candidates and that politicians on the right benefit more from beauty in low-information elections. Evidence from real and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011289386