When a monopolist has discretion over the timing of infrastructure investments, regulation of post-investment prices interferes with incentivizing socially optimal investment timing. In a model of regulated lumpy investment under uncertainty, we study regulation when the regulator can condition...

This paper studies informational externalities between contracts. Two principals (for instance the governments of two neighbouring countries) deal with two different agents (for instance a railway company in each country). If, in the first period, an agent refuses the contract offered by his...

The capacity of the transmission network determines the extent of integration of a multi-national energy market. Cross-border externalities render coordination of network capacity valuable. Is it then optimal to collect powers in the hands of a single regulator? Should a common system operator...

The capacity of the transmission network determines the extent of integration of a multinational energy market. Cross-border externalities render coordination of network maintenance and investments across countries valuable. Is it then optimal to collect powers in the hands of a single...

This paper studies the effect of disclosing conflicts of interests on strategic communication when the sender has lying costs. I present a simple economic mechanism under which such disclosure often leads to more informative, but at the same time also to more biased messages. This benefits...

This paper studies the effect of disclosing conflicts of interests on strategic communication when the sender has lying costs. I present a simple economic channel under which such disclosure often leads to more biased messages. This hurts receivers who are naive or delegate their choice while...

This paper characterizes the equilibrium sets of an intrinsic common agencygame with discrete types and direct revelation mechanisms. After presentinga general algorithm to find the pure-strategy equilibria of this game, we use itto characterize these equilibria when the two principals control...

This paper characterizes the equilibrium sets of an intrinsic common agency game with direct exter-nalities between principals both under complete and asymmetric information. Direct externalities arise when the contracting variable of one principal affects directly the other principal s payoff....

It is tricky to design local regulations on global externalities, especially so if firms are mobile. We show that when costs and outside options are firms' private information, the threat of firm relocation leads to local regulations that are stricter, not looser. This result is general and...