This paper contrasts two auction formats often used in public procurement: first price auctions with ex-post screening … analysis reveals that their ranking is ambiguous in terms of revenues, but the average bid auction is typically less efficient … is estimated for the sub-sample of first price auctions and used to quantify the efficiency loss under counterfactual …

experiment, we compare four different second-price auction formats for procuring a good. The four formats are a sealed … procurement auction formats can take advantage of bidders' willingness- to-pay-willingness-to-accept disparity. In a laboratory …-bid auction and three different descending-clock auctions. We assume that a bidder's willingness-to-accept exceeds his willingness …

behavior in the first-price auction, where both risk-aversion and loss aversion induce ‘overbidding.' We then show that the …

I study auctions in which firms bid for licenses that reduce their marginal costs in a post-auction downstream market …. When there are three or more firms, I show that the Vickrey--Clarke--Groves (VCG) auction maximizes consumer surplus in … surplus is ambiguous. When the VCG auction does not maximize consumer surplus, I show that consumer surplus can be maximized …

bidders account for this trade-off, using a sequential procurement auction with private cost information and varying …

We study the relative performance of the first-price sealed-bid auction and the second-price sealed-bid auction in a … winner's payment to an outside observer. We find that the first-price sealed-bid auction in which the winner's payment is …

We study the relative performance of the first-price sealed-bid auction and the second-price sealed-bid auction in a … winner's payment to an outside observer. We find that the first-price sealed-bid auction in which the winner's payment is …

equilibrium price dispersion can arise in this model as firms employ a Bayesian Nash pricing strategy. We provide conditions to … identify the model using price and another supply side data (such as market share). Our identification strategy is constructive …

We study the impact of auction design on the final prices paid by telecommunications operators for the past two decades … and a wide range of socio-economic indicators. Using a micro dataset of almost every mobile spectrum auction performed so … far – both regional and national – we show that auction design affects final prices paid. Two combinations of lot pricing …