uncertainty) and the elimination of Qimar (gambling) from auction contracts, the conventional online auction formats can be made …

to auction revenues, there is a tradeoff: provisions aimed at fostering post-auction competition in the downstream market … typically results in lower prices for consumers, but also in lower auction proceeds. We first characterize the optimal auction …

reserve price. While one of the possible explanations for jump bidding is based on signaling arguments, the ability of the … questionable. This paper shows that the seller's ability to set the reserve price after observing the opening bid reduces both jump …

is able to change its reserve price on the basis of the bidding history. The paper shows that although a higher cost of … the secondary information leads to a higher expected price, the precision of the preliminary information has an ambiguous …

by an adjusted auction strategy. The first-price auction can generate additional profits by placing a second, higher bid … transition. In this paper, we investigate the German pilot auction scheme for solar photovoltaics introduced in the Renewable … Energies Act 2014 (EEG 2104) that serves as a pilot for the auction-based promotion of the three major large-scale renewable …

In a field experiment, we study the revenue-generating properties of premium auctions. In a premium auction, the runner …-up obtains a premium for driving up the price paid by the winner. Previous research, both theoretical and in the lab, has shown … that the relative performance of premium auctions compared to standard auction formats is context-specific. In the …

We study efficient auction design for a single indivisible object when bidders have interdependent values and non … bad setting (i.e. a procurement auction) there is no mechanism that has an ex post efficient equilibrium if the level of …

pay, under symmetric independent private values. The first-price auction is the unique credible static mechanism. The … ascending auction is the unique credible strategy-proof mechanism …

We model the uniform-price US Treasury security auction as a static symmetric game of incomplete information in which … each payer is a primary dealer who submits a demand schedule given two independent sources of private information – his pre-auction … we show how his pre-auction short position impacts his bidding behavior – in particular: the dealer's demand for the …

more quickly increases one's WTP in an auction. Evidence from five experiments demonstrates this effect and pinpoints the … bidding behavior (1) is serially mediated by the perception that the auction is more intensely competitive and by a greater … desire to win, (2) is distinct from the effects of time pressure and of the auction's duration or overall rate of progression …