Tuning one's shower in some hotels may turn into a challenging coordination game with imperfect information. The temperature sensitivity increases with the number of agents, making the problem possibly unlearnable. Because there is in practice a finite number of possible tap positions, identical...

This paper derives sufficient conditions for a class of games of incomplete information, such as first price auctions, to have pure strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE). The paper treats games between two or more heterogeneous agents, each with private information about his own type (for example, a...

Selfish, strategic players may benefit from cooperation, provided they reach agreement. It is therefore important to construct mechanisms that facilitate such cooperation, especially in the case of asymmetric private information. The two major issues are: (1) singling out a fair and efficient...

J. Harsanyi introduced structural polymorphism in game theory, that is, there are many possible agent types such as “low productivity” or high productivity” with corresponding probability but all operating under one behavioral type, strict rationality. In this paper, we introduce...

Bayesian equilibrium by iterative conjectures (BEIC) analyzes games with players forming their conjectures of what other players will do iteratively starting with first order uninformative conjectures (or prior distribution functions) and updating their conjectures iteratively with game...

We employ the theory of Bayesian potential games to characterize pure-strategy equilibria of a Bayesian game with finite type structures, taking into account the cost/benefit features of agents. Building on a standard model of oligopolistic competition also applicable to environmental issues...