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Evolution of mindsight and psychological commitment among strategically interacting agents
Rtischev, Dimitry - In: Games 7 (2016) 3, pp. 1-16
We study the evolution of strategic psychological capabilities in a population of interacting agents. Specifically,we consider agentswhich are either blind orwithmindsight, and either transparent or opaque. An agent with mindsight can observe the psychological makeup of a transparent agent,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011550559
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On the evolution of heuristics and bounded rational behavior in random games
Spiliopoulos, Leonidas - 2021
The emergence of heuristics, sophisticated behavior—such as higher levels of Theory of Mind—and substantive rationality in strategic situations can be studied using evolutionary game theory to jointly account for the interactions between players and their environments. Research thus far has...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013314177
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Equilibrium selection under different learning modes in supermodular games
Kaarbøe, Oddvar M.; Tieman, Alexander F. - 1999
We apply the dynamic stochastic framework proposed by recent evolutionaryliterature to the class of strict supermodular games when two simplebehavior rules coexist in the population, imitation and myopic optimization.We assume that myopic optimizers are able to see how well their payoff...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011302143
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Psychology and economics rather than psychology versus economics : cultural differences but no barriers!
Brandstätter, Hermann; Güth, Werner; Kliemt, Hartmut - 2008
During the last three decades the ascent of behavioral economics clearly helped to bring down artificial disciplinary boundaries between psychology and economics. Noting that behavioral economics seems still under the spell of the rational choice tradition and, indirectly, of behaviorism we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003809939
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Adverse selection, heterogeneous beliefs, and evolutionary learning
Buchen, Clemens; Palermo, Alberto - 2021
We relax the common assumption of homogeneous beliefs in principal-agent relationships with adverse selection. Principals are competitors in the product market and write contracts also on the base of an expected aggregate. The model is a version of a cobweb model. In an evolutionary learning...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012607986
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An Evolutionary Justification for Overconfidence
Gannon, Kim - 2020
resource, and there is uncertainty about who will win the resource if they choose to compete. Players have different confidence … know her opponent's confidence level. We characterize the evolutionarily stable equilibrium, represented by players …' strategies and distribution of confidence levels. Under different informational environments, a majority of players are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012853848
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Personal Relationships and the Evolution of Trust
Schliffke, Philipp - 2009
In this paper, an indirect evolutionary version of the game of trust is studied. A population consisting of trustworthy and exploitive players is assumed. Players are chosen randomly from the population and are matched with either strangers or players they know in order to play the game of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013160188
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The evolution of morals under indirect reciprocity
Gaudeul, Alexia; Keser, Claudia; Müller, Stephan - 2019 - Revised version June 2019
We study the coexistence of strategies in the indirect reciprocity game where agents have access to second-order information. We fully characterize the evolutionary stable equilibria and analyze their comparative statics with respect to the cost-benefit ratio (CBR). There are indeed only two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012011743
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The coevolution of morals under indirect reciprocity
Gaudeul, Alexia; Keser, Claudia; Müller, Stephan - 2019
We study the coexistence of strategies in the indirect reciprocity game where agents have access to second-order information. We fully characterize the evolutionary stable equilibria and analyze their comparative statics with respect to the cost-benefit ratio (CBR). There are indeed only two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012005678
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Salience and strategy choice in 2 × 2 games
Leland, Jonathan W.; Schneider, Mark - In: Games 6 (2015) 4, pp. 521-559
We present a model of boundedly rational play in single-shot 2 × 2 games. Players choose strategies based on the perceived salience of their own payoffs and, if own-payoff salience is uninformative, on the perceived salience of their opponent's payoffs. When own payoffs are salient, the model's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011383906