Economic agents are not always rational or farsighted and can make decisions according to simple behavioral rules that vary according to situation and can be studied using the tools of evolutionary game theory. Furthermore, such behavioral rules are themselves subject to evolutionary forces....

In Keynesian Beauty Contests notably modeled by p-guessing games, players try to guess the average of guesses multiplied by p. Theoretical and experimental research in the spirit of level k models has characterized the behavior of agents with different levels of reasoning when p is persistently...

In this paper the existence and stability of equilibriums in an evolutionary game theory model of the labour market is studied by using the Lyapunov method. The model displays multiple equilibriums and it is shown that the Nash equilibriums of the static game are evolutionary stable equilibrium...

Evolutionary Finance focuses on questions of "survival and extinction" of investment strategies (portfolio rules) in the market selection process. It analyzes stochastic dynamics of financial markets in which asset prices are determined endogenously by a short-run equilibrium between supply and...

In repeated games there is in general a large set of equilibria. We also know that in the repeated prisoners dilemma there is a profusion of neutrally stable strategies, but no strategy that is evolutionarily stable. This paper investigates whether and how neutrally stable strategies can be...

Static and dynamic games are important tools for the analysis of strategic interactions among economic agents and have found many applications in economics. In many games, equilibria can be described as solutions of polynomial equations. In this paper, we describe state-of-the-art techniques for...

While ARCH/GARCH equations have been widely used to model financial market data, formal explanations for the sources of conditional volatility are scarce. This paper presents a model with the property that standard econometric tests detect ARCH/GARCH effects similar to those found in asset...

This paper addresses the question of whether our evolutionary history suggests that humans are likely to be individually selected selfish maximizers or group selected altruists. It surveys models from the literature of evolutionary biology in which groups are formed and dissolved and where the...

In the game of rock-paper-scissors with three players, this paper identifies conditions for a correlated equilibrium that differs from the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium and is evolutionarily stable. For this to occur, the correlation device attaches more probability to three-way ties and...