Income redistribution with an efficiency loss is expected to have a twofold negative effect on voters' support for redistribution, as it lowers aggregate egoistic support for redistribution and activates voters' efficiency preferences. The paper is dedicated to test whether such a negative...

Using a repeated public good game with stranger matching, we compare how two different reputation systems with endogenous evaluations affect rates of cooperation. Contributions are public information and each participant evaluates her partner's contribution. At the beginning of each period,...

Utilizing a simplified version of the Meltzer-Richard redistribution mechanism we designed a laboratory experiment to test whether it matters if voters were asked to decide on a tax rate or minimum income, leaving the redistribution mechanism itself unchanged. Framing the vote about...

Online interactions are frequently governed by reputation systems that allow users to evaluate each other after an interaction. Effective reputation systems can increase trust and may improve efficiency in market settings. In recent years, however, fake reviews have become increasingly...

Competitive rewards are often assigned on a regular basis, e.g., in annual salary negotiations or employee-of-the-month schemes. The repetition of competitions can imply that opponents are matched based on earlier outcomes. Using a real-effort experiment, we examine how cheating and effort...

This paper studies the ability of markets to alleviate taste-based discrimination in a laboratory experiment. We find that markets significantly reduce discrimination relative to individual choice situations with the same payoff structure and the same social group membership of the trading...

We present a theoretical model of a linear public good game in which heterogeneous players express social approval after observing contributions. The model explains how social approval is expressed and predicts positive contributions if subjects have a preference for social approval. Using a...