We analyse river sharing games in which a set of agents located along a river shares the available water. Using … coalition theory, we find that the potential benefits of water trade may not be sufficient to make all agents in the river … cooperate and acknowledge property rights as a prerequisite for trade. Specifically, a complete market for river water may not …

We analyse river sharing games in which a set of agents located along a river shares the available water. Using … coalition theory, we find that the potential benefits of water trade may not be sufficient to make all agents in the river … cooperate and acknowledge property rights as a prerequisite for trade. Specifically, a complete market for river water may not …

We analyse river sharing games in which a set of agents located along a river shares the available water. Using … coalition theory, we find that the potential benefits of water trade may not be sufficient to make all agents in the river … cooperate and acknowledge property rights as a prerequisite for trade. Specifically, a complete market for river water may not …

We analyse river sharing games in which a set of agents located along a river shares the available water. Using … coalition theory, we find that the potential benefits of water trade may not be su cient to make all agents in the river … cooperate and acknowledge property rights as a prerequisite for trade. Specifically, a complete market for river water may not …