This paper studies all‐pay auctions in which there is a buy‐price option for bidders to guarantee purchases at a seller‐specified price. We analyze symmetric increasing bidding equilibria in the first‐ and second‐price all‐pay auctions with the buy‐price option. While the optimal...

type="main" xml:lang="en" <p>We study optimal contracting by a monopolistic seller of investment goods to a time-inconsistent consumer and, in doing so, introduce asymmetric information to the model of DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004). We find (1) the below-marginal-cost-pricing rule may fail for a...</p>

We show that every (random) assignment/allocation without transfers can be considered as a market outcome with personalized prices and an equal income. One can thus evaluate an assignment by investigating the prices and the induced opportunity sets. When prices are proportional across agents,...