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corruption, increased citizen trust in parliament, and better quality of law-making. Others argue that disclosure rules endanger … composition of parliament empirically. We find that the introduction of disclosure rules is usually not accompanied by a … significant shift in the proportion of lawyers and businesspeople in parliament (direct effect). In general, we did not find …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013071165
This paper examines voting by members of Congress on three trade bills introduced in 1993 and 1994: the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the agreements concluded in the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations (GATT), and most-favored nation status for China. We first review...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013224935
This paper links the theory of interest groups influence over the legislature with that of congressional control over the judiciary. The resulting framework reconciles the theoretical literature of lobbying with the negative available evidence on the impact of lobbying over legislative outcomes,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013225056
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This paper links the theory of interest groups influence over the legislature with that of congressional control over the judiciary. The resulting framework reconciles the theoretical literature of lobbying with the negative available evidence on the impact of lobbying over legislative outcomes,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012467366
Despite the wide variety of agendas used in legislative settings, the literature on sophisticated voting has focused on two formats, the so-called Euro-Latin and Anglo-American agendas. In the current paper, I introduce a broad class of agendas whose defining structural features,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012415641
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We analyze a three-player legislative bargaining game over an ideological and a distributive decision. Legislators are privately informed about their ideological intensities, i.e., the weight placed on the ideological decision relative to the weight placed on the distributive decision....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674460