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Retelling the Story of the 2017 French Presidential Election : The Contribution of Approval Voting
Baujard, Antoinette; Lebon, Isabelle - 2020
This paper proposes an alternative reading of the politics of the 2017 French presidential election, using an unstudied … election process and outcome. The principal approach for understanding the political context has for many decades been a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014094202
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Policy Moderation and Endogenous Candidacy in Approval Voting Elections
Dellis, Arnaud - 2009
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014204686
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Information aggregation in Poisson elections
Ekmekci, Mehmet; Lauermann, Stephan - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 17 (2022) 1, pp. 1-23
The modern Condorcet jury theorem states that under weak conditions, when voters have common interests, elections will aggregate information when the population is large, in any equilibrium. Here, we study the performance of large elections with population uncertainty. We find that the modern...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806603
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Strategic Voting in Two-Party Legislative Elections
Hughes, Niall - 2020
It is commonly thought that in an election with two parties there can be no strategic voting - voters simply vote for … a single-district election. For large elections I show that the implemented policy bundle: (a) is uniquely pinned down … exists. These properties are not guaranteed in a single-district election. Furthermore, I show that: (i) parliamentary …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012835359
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A condorcet jury theorem for large poisson elections with multiple alternatives
Goertz, Johanna M. M. - In: Games 11 (2020) 1/2, pp. 1-12
that the CJT holds for large elections with two alternatives, but there is also an example of a large election with three …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012168613
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Focused power : experiments, the Shapley-Shubik power index, and focal points
Geller, Chris R.; Mustard, Jamie; Shahwan, Ranya - 2013
Experiments evaluate the fit of human behaviour to the Shapley-Shubik power index (SSPI), a formula of voter power. Groups of six subjects with differing votes divide a fixed purse by majority rule in online chat rooms. Earnings proxy for measured power. Chat rooms and processes for selecting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009789971
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Agendas in legislative decision-making
Horan, Sean - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 1, pp. 235-274
Despite the wide variety of agendas used in legislative settings, the literature on sophisticated voting has focused on two formats, the so-called Euro-Latin and Anglo-American agendas. In the current paper, I introduce a broad class of agendas whose defining structural features,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012415641
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Strictly sincere best responses under approval voting and arbitrary preferences
Alós-Ferrer, Carlos; Buckenmaier, Johannes - 2018 - This version: August, 2018
Approval voting allows voters to support as many candidates as they wish. One advantage of the method is that voters have weak or no incentives to vote insincerely. However, the exact meaning of this statement depends on how the voters' preferences over candidates are extended to sets. We show...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011926017
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Why should majority voting be unfair?
Breitmoser, Yves; Tan, Jonathan H. W. - 2017
The common use of majority rule in group decision making is puzzling. In theory, it inequitably favors the proposer, and paradoxically, it disadvantages voters further if they are inequity averse. In practice, however, outcomes are equitable. The present paper analyzes data from a novel...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011762571
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Squid Voting Game : Rational Indecisiveness in Sequential Voting
Kamada, Yuichiro; Yasuda, Yosuke - 2022
We consider a model of common-value sequential voting in which voters are differentiated in their information. We ask whether the intuition as in the simultaneous-voting case---voters with no information would vote so as not to influence the outcome---would be valid to imply long voting in our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014239132