We systematically investigate prisoner's dilemma games and dictator games with valence framing. We find that give versus take frames influence subjects' behavior and beliefs in the prisoner's dilemma game but not in the dictator game

The dynamics generated by individual learning mechanisms in evolutionary games rely upon the relationship between imitation and experimentation. We consider the dynamics created by individuals who learn through a process of selective imitation, for a general class of sequential, symmetric,...

We develop a stylized two-period game-theoretic model of the strategic choices made by soccer teams when selecting between defensive and attacking team formations, and between non-violent and violent styles of play. Cooperative behavior during the early stages of matches is typically superseded...

Does intuition favor prosociality, or does prosocial behavior require deliberative self-control? The Social Heuristics Hypothesis (SHH) stipulates that intuition favors typically advantageous behavior – but which behavior is typically advantageous depends on both the individual and the...

Strategy changes are an essential part of evolutionary games. Here we introduce a simple rule that, depending on the value of a single parameter w, influences the selection of players that are considered as potential sources of the new strategy. For positive w players with high payoffs will be...

Experimental studies show that the Nash equilibrium and its refinements are poor predictors of behavior in non-cooperative strategic games. Cooperation models, such as ERC and inequality aversion, yield superior predictions compared to the standard game theory predictions. However, those models...

We derive a generalized method for calculating the total number of Paretooptimal allocations (NOPA) in typical linear public goods games. Among other things, the method allows researchers to develop new experimental designs for testing the relevance of Pareto-optimality in experimental settings,...