Efficient regulation of the commons requires information about the regulated firms that is rarely available to regulators (e.g., cost of pollution abatement). Different mechanisms have been proposed for inducing firms to reveal their private information but for reasons I discuss in the paper, I...

We analyze oligopolistic exhaustible-resource depletion when ?rms can trade forward contracts on deliveries, a market structure prevalent in many resource commodity markets. We ?nd that this organization of trade has substantial implications for resource depletion. As ?rms’ interactions become...

We study whether and to what a large supplier facing a competitive fringe could effectively move the market of a depletable stock such as copper. We argue that the mere possibility for the large stockholder (i.e., leader) to sign forward contracts significantly reduces its market power. We show,...

In this paper, we investigate the effect of market power on the equilibrium path of an emission permits market in which firms can bank current permits for use in later periods. In particular, we study the market equilibrium for a large (potentially dominant) firm and a competitive fringe with...

Motivated by the price-setting process of water utilities in Chile, I study a final-offer arbitration game in which two parties simultaneously submits offers for each of the two or more units in which the item in dispute has been divided. The arbitrator is limited to choose one party’s offer...

We analyze oligopolistic exhaustible-resource depletion when firms can trade forward contracts on deliveries, a market structure prevalent in many resource commodity markets. We find that this organization of trade has substantial implications for resource depletion. As firms’ interactions...

I study the optimal design of marketable permit systems to regulate various pollutants (e.g., air pollution in urban areas) when the regulator lives in a real world of imperfect information and incomplete enforcement. I show that the regulator should hale pollution markets integrated through...

I study the advantages of pollution permit markets over uniform emission (or technology) standards when the regulator has incomplete information on firms' emissions and costs of production and abatement (e.g., air pollution in large cities). Because the regulator observes only each firm's...