Similar Search Results

Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism

Hashimoto, Tadashi; Hirata, Daisuke; Kesten, Onur; … - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 9 (2014) 1, pp. 253-277

This paper studies the problem of assigning a set of indivisible objects to a set of agents when monetary transfers are not allowed and agents reveal only ordinal preferences, but random assignments are possible. We offer two characterizations of the probabilistic serial mechanism, which assigns...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011684921

Pair-Efficient Reallocation of Indivisible Objects

Ekici, Ozgun - 2022

hence relax this constraint and consider pair-efficiency. A rule is pair-efficient if it never induces an allocation at …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013308232

Allocation of an Indivisible Object on the Full Preference Domain : Axiomatic Characterizations

Korpeoglu, C. Gizem - 2017

We study the allocation problem of an indivisible object to one of several agents on the full preference domain when …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012970732

Strategy-proofness on bankruptcy problems with an indivisible object

Hashimoto, Kazuhiko; Nakayama, Yu - 2016

We analyze bankruptcy problems with an indivisible object, where real owners and outside traders want to allocate an indivisible object among them with monetary compensation. The object might be a company that has gone bankrupt or a house left by a parent who has died, and so on. We show that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011434024

Notions of anonymity for object assignment : impossibility theorems

Kondo, Hikaru; Serizawa, Shigehiro - 2015

We search for impartiality in the allocation of objects when monetary transfers are not possible. Our main focus is … introducing randomization to object allocation problems is almost inevitable for achieving impartiality. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010487558

Double implementation in a market for indivisible goods with a price constraint

Azacis, Helmuts - 2005

-free allocation is selected with respect to these announced preferences. I prove that the proposed mechanism implements both in Nash …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011517013

Pre-Exchange-Proof House Allocation

Fujinaka, Yuji - 2017

We consider house allocation problems (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) with strict preferences. We introduce a new axiom …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012961731

Endowments-Swapping-Proof House Allocation

Fujinaka, Yuji - 2018

We consider house (re)allocation problems (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) with strict preferences. We are concerned with the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012921955

A theory of fair random allocation under priorities

Han, Xiang - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 19 (2024) 3, pp. 1185-1221

In the allocation of indivisible objects under weak priorities, a common practice is to break the ties using a lottery … acceptance algorithm and the probabilistic serial mechanism as special cases. Instead of randomizing over deterministic …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014635425

House allocation with overlapping agents : a dynamic mechanism design approach

Kurino, Morimitsu - 2009

Many real-life applications of house allocation problems are dynamic. For example, in the case of on-campus housing for …, we introduce a model of house allocation with overlapping agents. In terms of dynamic mechanism design, we examine two …-proofness. We provide another simple dynamic mechanism that is strategy-proof and Pareto efficient. -- house allocation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003883281

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Next
Last