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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10007695131
In the hierarchy of China's state sector, both before and during the current reform period, government bureaucrats select and supervise state-owned enterprise (SOE) managers. The incentive problem of SOE managers has been studied carefully, but that of the bureaucrats has not. This paper uses a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014222356
The degree of uncertainty in a worker's productivity is affected by many factors, such as worker-employer matching, technology, and macroeconomic conditions. Not surprisingly, uncertainty in labor productivity (ULP) varies across firms, industries, and economies. The question arises: How do...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014122573
We construct an agency model in which the agent makes project starting and termination decisions on behalf of the profit maximizing principal. The model shows that, to induce the agent's effort to gather information about the projects, the optimal incentive contract should impose restrictions on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014063901
Local governments (LGs) are seen as producers of the local public good ("the good"). An authoritarian country is one in which the government decides if the good should be produced and how much to tax to finance it, as versus a democracy in which voters decide. This paper identifies conditions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014191074
This paper studies the soft budget constraint problem in a principal-agent model. The agent screens projects of and makes initial investment in the projects that have passed the screening. He then finds the types of the funded projects and decides to close some of the ex post inefficient ones...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968849
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005820552
An equilibrium model of labor contracts under asymmetric information is developed. A profit-maximizing firm offers a wage but retains the right to lay off the worker based on its private observation of the worker's productivity ex post. The worker invests in specific human capital, unobservable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005053274
We construct an agency model in which the planner (agent) makes project starting and termination decisions on behalf of the state (principal) to reflect the practice of socialist economies. The model shows that asymmetric information between the state and the planner regarding the quality of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005489869
During transition, maintaining employment and providing a social safety net for the unemployed are important to social stability, which in turn is crucial for the productivity of the whole economy. Because independent institutions for social safety are lacking and firms with strong profit...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504537