International institutions that include an escape clause generate more durable and stable cooperative international regimes, and are easier to achieve ex ante. The escape clause is endogenous in a model of repeated trade-barrier setting in the presence of symmetric, two-sided, political...

Trade policy is set by domestic political bargaining between globalists and protectionists, representing owners of factors specific to export and import-competing sectors respectively. Consistent with the post-Civil War Era of Restriction, protectionists implement high tariffs when status quo...

A domestic ratification game nested within an international bargaining game establishes that domestic politics influences the outcome of international negotiations. When information on the domestic side is incomplete, an informational role of lobbies is established. Cooperation is more likely...

Over the past fifty years, barriers to international trade have decreased substantially. A key source of this decline in protectionism has been the proliferation of agreements among countries to liberalize commerce. In this article, we analyze the domestic political conditions under which states...

In a two-player proactive response game the level of proactive activity and the choice of terrorist target is endogenized. The targeted government first chooses its measures to weaken the terrorists, and the terrorists then choose the type of event—normal or spectacular. Unlike previous...

How does variation in the strength of a court’s jurisdiction and enforcement affect strategic behavior by states involved in international disputes? The authors construct a formal model and identify three important ways that legal institutions can have a deleterious effect on...

Elections affect both the probability of successful ratification and the terms of international trade agreements; domestic politics in its simplest form shapes international negotiations. Without elections, the extent of protection in a trade agreement increases with the degree of divided...

International institutions that include an escape clause generate more durable and stable cooperative international regimes and are easier to achieve <italic>ex ante</italic>. The escape clause is endogenous in a model of repeated trade-barrier setting in the presence of symmetric, two-sided, political...