In this paper we criticize the so-called 'more economic approach' to European competition law for its disregard of the importance of a functional system of private law. The more economic approach presumes that vertical integration is an economically efficient governance-mechanism. This...

The paper addresses the paradox that, although it is generally recognised among economists that minimum and fixed resale price maintenance can have both positive and negative effects on consumer welfare, the current approach under EC competition law can still be characterised as a de facto per...

This article examines the meaning and scope of the notion of anticompetitive effects in EU competition law. It does so by bringing together several strands of the case law (and this across all provisions, namely Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and merger control). The analysis is structured around a...

A quot;price squeeze,quot; or quot;margin squeeze,quot; is a theory of antitrust liability under section 2 of the Sherman Act that concerns a vertically integrated monopolist that sells its upstream bottleneck input to firms that compete with the monopolist's production of a downstream product...

Distribution cartels in the automotive sector used to be frequently dismantled and sanctioned by the European Commission and the EU Courts still some 15 years ago. In recent years, however, only a few cases have been reported at the national level of EU Member States. Is it because the...

• There is not a unique legal test in EU competition law. There is conduct that is prima facie unlawful irrespective of its effects, and conduct that is lawful. In between, some practices are prohibited where actual or likely effects can be shown.• This paper seeks to map the various tests...

• Pay-for-delay cases raise fundamental points of law, including the notion of (potential) competition and restriction by object.• According to the rich case law addressing the relationship between Article 101(1) TFEU and intellectual property – including Nungesser and BAT (Toltecs-Dorcet)...

Competition law's vertical agreement requirement is widely regarded to be perplexing and to offer a fairly limited unilateral action defense. These views prove to be understated. The underlying distinction is incoherent on a number of levels and difficult to reconcile with pertinent statutes,...

The correct welfare assessment of vertical agreements in competition law is a difficult craft. The more mature jurisdictions such as the EU and the US have struggled to develop the optimal framework. This paper scrutinises the vertical agreements cases of the Competition Commission of India...

In The Antitrust Paradox, Robert Bork discusses policy responses to naked and ancillary price fixing as well as vertical restraints. Empirical research finds that vertical restraints are generally welfare-enhancing. We examine cartels that used vertical restraints to support collusion. We find...