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Chapter 2. Aspects of the Economics of Organization with Application to Corporate Governance

Hermalin, Benjamin E. - 2017

This chapter provides a critical review and survey of aspects of formal and informal contracting particularly relevant to the study of corporate governance. Two types of modeling, hidden-information agency and informal (relational) contracting that are perhaps under-utilized in governance...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014023373

Origin of the Theory of Agency : An Account By One of the Theory's Originators

Mitnick, Barry M. - 2019

The first scholars to propose, explicitly, that a theory of agency be created, and to actually begin its creation, were … theory of agency, and Mitnick for the institutional theory of agency, though the basic concepts underlying these approaches … origin and early years of the theory, placing its development in the context of other research in this area …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014223582

Managerial incentives and stackelberg equilibria in oligopoly

Scrimitore, Marcella - 2010

The paper investigates both quantity and price oligopoly games in markets with a variable number of managerial and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011524757

Market Competition and Lower Tier Incentives

Theilen, Bernd - 2008

The relationship between competition and performance-related pay has been analyzed in single-principal-single-agent models. While this approach yields good predictions for managerial pay schemes, the predictions fail to apply for employees at lower tiers of a firm's hierarchy. In this paper, a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012768537

Our product is unique : a note on a delegation game with differentiated products

Buchen, Clemens; Hartmann, Sven A.; Palermo, Alberto - 2021

We analyze a Cournot duopoly market with differentiated goods and the separation between ownership and control. We consider a delegation game, for which the owner of a firm hires a manager who acts as if the good has a lower degree of substitutability than it really has. This is so either...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012595219

Tacit collusion of conglomerate firms through price signaling under multimarket contact

Horstmann, Niklas - 2016

We suggest a price signaling strategy that offers a microfoundation for the process leading to tacit collusion under multimarket contact, even in cases where previous theoretical explanations fail. It rests on the assumptions that firms can communicate collusive intentions solely through their...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013006153

Signaling Quality through Prices in an Oligopoly

Janssen, Maarten C.W.; Roy, Santanu - 2007

is severe. In a symmetric Bertrand oligopoly where products may differ only in their quality, production cost is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325591

Oligopolistic screening and two-way distortion

Cella, Michela; Etro, Federico - 2010

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010426344

Gaming and Strategic Opacity in Incentive Provision

Ederer, Florian - 2019

It is often suggested that incentive schemes under moral hazard can be gamed by an agent with superior knowledge of the environment and that deliberate lack of transparency about the incentive scheme can reduce gaming. We formally investigate these arguments in a two-task moral hazard model in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012905446

Authority and incentives in organizations

Kräkel, Matthias - 2013

The paper analyzes how the choice of organizational structure leads to the best compromise between controlling behavior based on authority rights and minimizing costs for implementing high efforts. Concentrated delegation and hierarchical delegation turn out to be never an optimal compromise. If...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009748623