This article analyzes the basic characteristics of the Argentine competition law and the way in which it has been enforced in several important antitrust cases. We begin with a section that introduces the evolution of the law, followed by another section about the basic economic and legal...

The purpose of this report is to contribute to the analysis of two questions. Should a merger control system take into account efficiency gains from horizontal mergers, and balance these gains against the anti-competitive effects of mergers? If so, how should a system be designed to account for...

This report studies the importance of efficiency gains from horizontal mergers. A general theme throughout this report is that efficiency gains, and their pass-on to consumers, may vary substantially from merger to merger. For this reason it seems appropriate to reconsider current practice in...

Backward vertical integration by a dominant firm into an upstream competitive industry causes both input and output prices to rise. The dominant firm's cost advantage may or may not offset the negative effect to higher prices on social welfare. Whether it does depends on a simple indicator...

Para cezaları düzenleyici kurumların çok önemli bir yaptırım aracıdır. İllegal faaliyeti durdurmak ve tekrarını önlemek için yeterince ağır olmalılar ve etkili biçimde uygulanmalıdırlar

Rekabeti bozan, tüketici haklarını çiğneyen ve ekonominin rekabet gücüne zarar veren kartellerin, yetkili kurumlarca soruşturulması ve ağır biçimde cezalandırılması gerekmektedir. Ancak, Rekabet Kurulunun rekabet ihlallerine uyguladığı para cezalarına kısaca göz...

Although both in US antitrust and European competition law there is a clear evolution to a much broader application of "rule of reason" (instead of per-se rules), there is also an increasing awareness of the problems of a case-by-case approach. The "error costs approach" (minimizing the sum of...

Forthcoming in the Journal of Public Economics. We study the consequences of leniency – reduced legal sanctions for wrongdoers who spontaneously self-report to law enforcers – on sequential, bilateral, illegal transactions, such as corruption, manager-auditor collusion, or drug...

Mergers that substantially lessen competition are challenged by antitrust authorities. Instead of blocking anticompetitive transitions straight away, authorities might choose to negotiate with the merging parties and allow the transactions to proceed with modifications that restore or preserve...

We consider antitrust enforcement within the adversarial model used by the United States. We show that, under the adversarial system, the Antitrust Authority may try to prohibit mergers also in those cases in which litigation is inefficient. Even if market concentration and technological...