We test the effect of players' moods on their behavior in a gift-exchange game. In the first stage of the game, player 1 chooses a transfer to player 2. In the second stage, player 2 chooses an effort level. Higher effort is more costly for player 2, but it increases player 1's payoff. We say...

Social facilitation describes the effect on performance due to the mere presence of others. Here we study the effect of the mere presence of an audience on the behavior of people involved in a strategic interaction and on the performance of institutions. In our laboratory experiment, two active...

Economics

An investment bubble is a period of excessive, and predictably unpro table, investment (DeMarzo, Kaniel and Kremer, 2007, p.737). Such bubbles most often accompany the arrival of some new technology, such as the tech stock boom and bust of the late 1990 s and early 2000 s. We provide a rational...

This paper constructs an equilibrium model of entrepreneurial innovation where individuals differ in their attitude toward uncertainty. Unlike previous models of innovation, the firm-formation process is endogenous. An entrepreneur, who owns residual profits, utilizes an uncertain technology and...

We analyze a dynamic model of strategic interaction between a professional sport league that organizes a tournament, the teams competing to win it, and the broadcasters paying for the rights to televise it. Teams and broadcasters maximize expected profits, while the league's objective may be...

People who are members of a group and identify with it behave differently from people who perceive themselves as isolated individuals. This paper shows that group membership affects preferences over outcomes, and saliency of the group affects the perception of the environment. We manipulate the...

We test the effect of players' moods on their behavior in a gift-exchange game. In the first stage of the game, player 1 chooses a transfer to player 2. In the second stage, player 2 chooses an effort level. Higher effort is more costly for player 2, but it increases player 1's payoff. We say...

This paper considers a general equilibrium model in which the=20 distinction between un-certainty and risk is formalized by assuming agents= =20 have incomplete preferences over state-contingent consumption bundles, as=20 in Bewley (1986). Without completeness, individual decision making...