This paper examines the competitive effects of resale price maintenance (RPM) through inventory decisions under demand uncertainty. We focus on the Japanese publishing industry where RPM is allowed. We develop and estimate a model of RPM in which price and inventory are determined before demand...

Leegin and the literature on resale price maintenance (RPM) have largely overlooked the Internet phenomenon despite the fact that it has substantially changed the way many consumers shop. This paper looks at the characteristics of Internet retailing and explores how they may affect the free...

This article is adapted for the Journal of Internet Law from a more in-depth article that the author has published: Resale Price Maintenance: The Internet Phenomenon and Free Rider Issues, 55 Antitrust Bulletin 473 (2010). It examines the characteristics of the Internet, online retailing, and...

This is a survey of the economic principles that underlie antitrust law and how those principles relate to competition policy. We address four core subject areas: market power, collusion, mergers between competitors, and monopolization. In each area, we select the most relevant portions of...

On February 2, 2017, the European Commission announced the launch on its own initiative of three sets of investigations into suspected anticompetitive behavior in online commerce.2 The three sectors inquired have been (i) consumer electronics manufacturers; (ii) video games publishers; and (iii)...

Low prices are one of antitrust law's traditional promises to society. Resale price maintenance (RPM), the practice whereby a manufacturer sets pricing rules for retailers, artificially inflates prices and, thus, allegedly runs afoul of antitrust laws. The practice emerged in the last quarter of...

The paper addresses the paradox that, although it is generally recognised among economists that minimum and fixed resale price maintenance can have both positive and negative effects on consumer welfare, the current approach under EC competition law can still be characterised as a de facto per...

We present a model to explain why a manufacturer may impose a minimum resale price (min RPM) in a successive monopoly setting. Our argument relies on the retailer having non-contractible choice variables, which could represent the price of a substitute good and/or the effort the retailer exerts...