In his 1971’s Dynamic Models of Segregation paper, the economist Thomas C. Schelling showed that a small preference for one’s neighbors to be of the same color could lead to total segregation, even if total segregation does not correspond to individual preferences and to a residential...

We propose an analytical resolution of Schelling segregation model for a general class of utility functions. Using evolutionary game theory, we provide conditions under which a potential function, which characterizes the global configuration of the city and is maximized in the stationary state,...

We analyze the effect of the degree of judicial enforcement on the probability of credit constraints, the amount of loan and the probability of default. Contrary to the traditional view on judicial efficiency of credit market, our estimation results show that better judicial enforcement...

In this work, we use the VAR and space-state methodology to analyze how the recent developments in 20 European countries have modified the dynamics of structural shocks. Our results confirm a visible progress in (predominated output fluctuations) supply shocks convergence between the CEECs and...

This paper shows that internationalized production, modelled as trade in inter- mediate goods, challenges the standard result according to which exchange rate volatility insulates small open economies from external shocks. Movements of relative prices aect the economy through an additional...

In his 1971's Dynamic Models of Segregation paper, the economist Thomas C. Schelling showed that a small preference for one's neighbors to be of the same color could lead to total segregation, even if total segregation does not correspond to individual preferences and to a residential...

We propose an analytical solution to a Schelling segregation model for a relatively broad range of utility functions. Using evolutionary game theory, we provide existence conditions for a potential function, which characterizes the global configuration of the city and is maximized in the...

This paper applies the idea of evolution to a spatial model. We assume that prisoners' dilemmas or coordination games are played repeatedly within neighborhoods where players do not optimize but instead copy successful strategies. Discriminatory behavior of players is introduced representing...

We introduce social interactions into the Schelling model of residential choice. These social interactions take the form of a Prisoner's Dilemma game played with neighbors. First, we study the Schelling model over a wide range of utility functions and then proceed to study a spatial Prisoner's...

Residential segregation is a key public policy issue that is driven by economic factors on the one side, and individual attitudes towards ethnic diversity on the other side. We assume a modeling framework that consists of a population of two ethnic groups, a rental market for each neighborhood,...