One of the main problems in current economic theory is to write contracts which are Pareto optimal, incentive compatible, and also implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a dynamic, noncooperative game. The question arises whether it is possible to provide Walrasian type or...

Numerous, mainly empirical, studies of auditing behaviour have recently looked at the “reputation” of the auditor and the size of fees it attracts. Our model of the auditing market advances the study of the fundamental principles involved in determining behaviour in relation to the rewards...

In bargaining theory a usual assumption is either that of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions or that of continuous preferences. Recently we considered in Glycopantis a bargaining model which breaks away from this traditional treatment by employing lexicographic preferences of a...

The supply of information, particularly of bad news, in an agency relationship is a sensitive issue. We employ a game theory approach to investigate conflicts in the particular case of the doctor-patient relationship when information affects the emotions of patients. The doctor does not know the...

The purpose of this note is to discuss the envelope relationship between long run and short run cost functions. It compares the usually presented relationship with one of different form and implications, resulting from a simple production function and constant prices. It points out in particular...