The purpose is to discuss, using examples, issues in game theory which have been occasionally discussed and not always fully. There has been intense research and progress in academic journal and specialized volumes, but there is scope for a simple analysis of the basic ideas through further...

The paper has as a starting point the work of the philosopher Professor D. Lewis.We provide a detailed presentation and complete analysis of the sender/receiver Lewis signaling game using a game theory extensive form, decision tree formulation. It is shown that there are a number of Bayesian...

In the context of finite extensive form games, we consider games of imperfect and perfect recall. We look briefly at the famous Kuhn theorem. However we are mainly concerned with imperfect recall games in which paths can intersect information sets in more than one node. Explicit examples are...

One of the main problems in current economic theory is to write contracts which are Pareto optimal, incentive compatible, and also implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a dynamic, noncooperative game. The question arises whether it is possible to provide Walrasian type or...

Bringing scholars and policymakers to the frontiers of research and addressing the critical issues of the day, the book presents original important new theoretical and empirical results. The distinguished contributors include: P. Agrel, K. Alexander, J. Crémer, X. Dassiou, G. Deltas, F. Etro,...

This paper shows that for a price setting monopsony, offering to transact in a mixed bundle of goods of uncertain quality is profit enhancing. The magnitude of this enhancement relative to no bundling is greater the smaller the gap in the degree of quality uncertainty between the two goods...