In venture capital markets, contracts between investors and enterprises stipulate special incentives and restrictions in order to address the occurrence of severe asymmetric information, to reduce investor risk, and to facilitate successful exits. The purpose of this paper is to provide an...

We study the problem of an investor that buys an equity stake in an entrepreneurial venture, under the assumption that the former cannot monitor the latter’s operations. The dynamics implied by the optimal incentive scheme is rich and quite different from that induced by other models of...

We propose a model of asset management in which benchmarking arises endogenously, and analyze its unintended welfare consequences. Fund managers' portfolios are unobservable and they incur private costs in running them. Conditioning managers' compensation on a benchmark portfolio's performance...

We consider a highly-qualified individual with respect to her choice between two distinct career paths. She can choose between a mid-level management position in a large company and an executive position within a smaller listed company with the possibility to directly affect the company’s...

This article analyzes optimal nonlinear portfolio management contracts. We consider a setting in which the investor faces moral hazard with respect to the effort and risk choices of the portfolio manager. The employment contract promises the manager: (i) a fixed payment, (ii) a proportional...

This study analyzes small-sized asset owners' optimal choice problems in selecting an outsourced chief investment officer (OCIO). While large-sized asset owners can select OCIOs through procurement auctions, it is difficult for small-sized asset owners to use this method. Instead, they access...

The scope of this paper is to enhance the model for the own-company stockholder (given in Desmettre, Gould and Szimayer (2010)), who can voluntarily performance-link his personal wealth to his man- agement success by acquiring stocks in the own-company whose value he can directly influence via...

I study optimal financial contracting when neither cash flows nor the risk profile of project choices are verifiable. Using a contracting framework, I show the resulting two frictions (cash-diversion and asset-substitution) are intricately linked: to address the cash-diversion problem, an...

Previous literature shows that employee ownership can be used as a reward management tool or as entrenchment mechanism. This paper develop a model suggesting that employee ownership policy reveals management quality. Good managers would use employee ownership as a reward management tool whereas...

Employee ownership is often used as a reward management tool but also as entrenchment mechanism. This paper develops a model suggesting that employee ownership policy reveals management quality. Good managers would use employee ownership as a reward management tool whereas bad managers would...