Es wird die Grundidee einer direktdemokratischen Plattformpartei vorgestellt, dass die bei ihr registrierten Wähler über alle (wichtigen) Einzelfragen abstimmen dürfen und ihre Abgeordneten sie nicht nach Mehrheitsbeschluss, sondern proportional vertreten. Dazu werden wichtige Varianten, die...

We model costly, strategic voting in an electorate divided between a single pro-incumbent and multiple pro-opposition groups, and study the effect of the homogeneity of preferences within the opposition electorate on voter turnout. If each opposition group is represented by a separate candidate,...

We study the effect of power sharing over income redistribution among different socio-economic groups in a model of redistributive politics with fairness concern. We prove that a unique pure-strategy equilibrium exists under fairly general conditions; and we show that equilibrium transfers...

We present a theoretical model of a parliamentary democracy, where party structures, government coalitions and fiscal policies are endogenously determined. The model predicts that, relative to proportional elections, majoritarian elections reduce government spending because they reduce party...

We ask three questions. First, do election systems differ in how they translate physical attractiveness of candidates into electoral success? Second, do political parties strategically exploit the "beauty premium" when deciding on which candidates to nominate, and, third, do elected MPs use...