In uniform price, sealed-bid day-ahead electricity auctions, the market price is set at the intersection between aggregate demand and supply functions built by a market operator. Each day, just one agent - the marginal generator - owns the market-clearing plant. Day-ahead auctions are moreover...

This study investigates the determinants of the great difference between winning bids and reserve prices in the transmission electricity sector in Brazil between 1999- 2010, through an econometric approach based on Heckman (1979) that considers the heterogeneous among the winner's and loser's...

Laboratory experiments reporting on shortfalls from allocative efficiency of allocation mechanisms depend on the induced-values methodology, which cannot be extended to the field. Harstad [2011] proposes to observe efficiency of allocation mechanisms without knowing motivations via behavior in...

Auctions are a popular and prevalent form of trading mechanism, despite the restriction that the seller cannot price-discriminate among potential buyers. To understand why this is the case, we consider an auction-like environment in which a seller with an indivisible object negotiates with two...

The purpose of this study is to evaluate the economic benefits of country of origin labeling (COOL) regulation by estimating the consumer's willingness to pay (WTP) for Taiwan products vs. other imported products if clearly labeled with their countries of origin. We employ the Vickrey...

This paper studies collusion in repeated auctions when bidders communicate prior to each stage auction. The paper presents a folk theorem for independent and correlated private signals and general interdependent values. Specifically, it identifies conditions under which an equilibrium collusion...

This paper analyzes an all-pay auction where the winner is determined according to the sum of the bid and a handicap endowed to all players. The bidding strategy in equilibrium is then explicitly derived as a 'piecewise affine transformation' of the equilibrium strategy in an all-pay auction...

The auctioning rule in Japanese flower markets is a slightly modi-fied version of that of the original Dutch flower auction. At Japaneseflower markets, there is an additional stage, called 'mari', where buyers who lost in the previous auction can apply for purchasing the remainder of flowers at...

We consider situations where a society tries to efficiently allocate several homogeneous and indivisible goods among agents. Each agent receives at most one unit of the good. For example, suppose that a government wishes to allocate a fixed number of licenses to operate in its country to private...

Economic experiments conducted in laboratories employing an induced-values methodology can report on allocative efficiencies observed. This methodology is limited by requiring the experimenter to know subjects' motivations, an impossibility in field experiments. Allocative efficiency implies a...