We develop a model of bank risk-taking with strategic sovereign default risk. Domestic banks invest in real projects and purchase government bonds. While an increase in bond purchases crowds out profitable investments, it improves the government's incentives to repay and therefore lowers its...

Banking regulation routinely designates some assets as safe and thus does not require banks to hold any additional capital to protect against losses from these assets. A typical such safe asset is domestic government debt. There are numerous examples of banking regulation treating domestic...

The bail-in tool as implemented in the European bank resolution framework suffers from severe shortcomings. To some extent, the regulatory framework can remedy the impediments to the desirable incentive effect of private sector involvement (PSI) that emanate from a lack of predictability of...

This paper studies the effects of government guarantees on the interconnection between banking and sovereign debt crises in a framework where both the banks and the government are fragile and the credibility and feasibility of the guarantees are determined endogenously. The analysis delivers...

We contribute to the better understanding of the key factors related to the operation of the banking system that led to the global financial crisis through the development of a dual earning warning model that explores the joint determination of the probability of a distressed bank to face a...

This study examines the impact of bank liquidity on bank risk taking. Using quarterly data for U.S. bank holding companies from 1986 to 2014 we find evidence to support that more liquid banks take more risk. This key result is robust for alternative bank risk and liquidity proxies, including...

We study a novel mechanism through which systemic risk, in the form of self-fulfilling runs, forces the banks to hoard liquidity. To this end, we develop an environment where banks offer insurance to their depositors against both idiosyncratic and aggregate real uncertainty, by holding a...

We develop a theoretical model examining the financial stability policy of a central bank serving as both the lender of last resort and the regulator of the financial system. The model accommodates the possibility of financial contagion through interbank market linkages, and adverse feedback...

We model dynamic bank capital structure under three optimally-designed regulatory regimes dealing with potential default { bailout, where government provides capital; bail-in, using private-sector funds; and no regulatory intervention, allowing failure. Only under optimally designed bail-in do...

Short-term debt is commonly used to fund illiquid assets. A conventional view asserts that such arrangements are run-prone in part because redemptions must be processed on a first-come, first-served basis. This sequential service protocol, however, appears absent in the wholesale banking...