When goods are substitutes, the Vickrey outcome is in the core and yields competitive seller revenue. In contrast, with complements, the Vickrey outcome is efficient but not necessarily in the core and revenue can be low. Non-core outcomes may be perceived as unfair since there are bidders...

When goods are substitutes, the Vickrey outcome is in the core and yields competitive seller revenue. In contrast, with complements, the Vickrey outcome is efficient but not necessarily in the core and revenue can be low. Non-core outcomes may be perceived as unfair since there are bidders...

We provide a Bayes–Nash equilibrium analysis of the simultaneous ascending auction (SAA) when local bidders interested in a single item compete against global bidders interested in aggregating many items. We first assume that each local bidder values only a specific item, e.g. the license for...

We analyze the dynamic simultaneous ascending auction (SAA), which was pioneered by the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in 1994 and has since become the standard to conduct large-scale, large-stakes spectrum auctions around the world. We consider an environment where local bidders,...

We analyze the dynamic simultaneous ascending auction (SAA), which was pioneered by the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in 1994 and has since become the standard to conduct large-scale, large-stakes spectrum auctions around the world. We consider an environment where local bidders,...