This paper provides a structural empirical analysis of Dutch auctions of houseplants at the flower auction in Aalsmeer, the Netherlands. The data set is unique for Dutch auctions in the sense that it includes observations of all losing bids in an interval adjacent to the winning bid. The size of...

This article investigates bid updating and subject learning in experimental initial public offers (IPO) of stock pricing methods. A clock auction stands for the "Dutch auction". A sealed-bid uniform price auction represents "book building". A two-stage "book building" emulation represents a...

As business-to-business commerce shifts to the Internet, newer suppliers with cheaper but unreliable technologies enter the market place to win orders from firms by beating the price of their perfectly reliable (but expensive) competitors. The dilemma facing purchasing firms is the allocation of...

The targeted design of auctions has to take behavioral regularities into account. This paper explores whether procurement auction formats can take advantage of bidders' willingness-to-pay-willingness-to-accept disparity. In a laboratory experiment, we compare four different second-price auction...

I propose a Bayesian method to analyze bid data from first-price auctions under private value paradigms. I use a series representation to specify the valuation density so that bidding monotonicity is always satisfied, and I impose density affiliation by the nonparametric technique of Beresteanu...

We propose a Bayesian Metropolis-Gibbs Monte Carlo Markov Chain (MCMC) algorithm to estimate parameters of a sample selection model in which the selected equation include a binary endogenous explanatory variable, using a three simultaneous equation model. We apply our methodology to...

The innovation of construction procurement by means of electronic reverse auctions is a controversial subject of discussion among both researchers and practitioners. This paper consolidates and critically discusses current knowledge concerning the adoption and use of electronic reverse auctions...

We study an in.nitely-repeated .rst-price auction with common values. Initially, bid-ders receive independent private signals about the objects. value, which itself does not change over time. Learning occurs only through observation of the bids. Under one-sided incomplete information, this...

A finite number of sellers (n) compete in schedules to supply an elastic demand. The costs of the sellers have uncertain common and private value components and there is no exogenous noise in the system. A Bayesian supply function equilibrium is characterized; the equilibrium is privately...

We consider takeover bidding in a Cournot oligopoly when firms have private information concerning the synergy effect of merging with a takeover target. Two auction rules are considered: standard first-price and profit-share auctions, supplemented by entry fees. Since non-merged firms benefit...