In this paper we apply the Complete Analysis of Differentiable Games (introduced by D. Carfì in [3], [6], [8], [9], and already employed by himself and others in [4], [5], [7]) to the classic Cournot Duopoly (1838), classic oligopolistic market in which there are two enterprises producing the...

Predicting group decisions with uncertain outcomes involves the empirically difficult task of disentangling individual decision makers' beliefs and preferences over outcomes' states from the group's decision rule. This paper addresses the problem within the context of a consequential family...

Generative artificial intelligence holds enormous potential to revolutionize decision-making processes, from everyday to high-stake scenarios. However, as many decisions carry social implications, for AI to be a reliable assistant for decision-making it is crucial that it is able to capture the...

In this paper we apply the Complete Analysis of Differentiable Games (introduced by D. Carfì in [3], [6], [8] and [9]) and al-ready employed by himself and others in [4], [5], [7]) to the classic Bertrand Duopoly (1883), classic oligopolistic market in which there are two enterprises producing...

The need for efficient coordination is ubiquitous in organizations and industries. The literature on the determinants of efficient coordination has focused on individual decision-making so far. In reality, however, teams often have to coordinate with other teams. We present an experiment with...

We show that the level of trust and reciprocity in an intercultural trust game experiment between Austrian and Japanese subjects differs from the results of an intracultural experiment run in the respective countries among compatriots. Austrian subjects show significantly higher levels of trust...

We study experimentally whether heterogeneity of behavior in the Centipede game can be interpreted as the result of a learning process of individuals with different preference types (more and less pro-social) and coarse information regarding the opponent's past behavior. We manipulate the...

We experimentally investigate multiple notions of equity in ultimatum bargaining with asymmetric outside options. Building on the generalized equity principle formulated by Selten (1978), we derive three different equity rules that can explain 43% of all offers. Our within-subject design further...

In this paper, we describe a series of laboratory experiments that implement specific examples of a more general network structure and we examine equilibrium selection. Specifically, actions are either strategic substitutes or strategic complements, and participants have either complete or...

A growing experimental literature studies the endogenous choice of institutions to solve cooperation problems arising in prisoners' dilemmas, public goods games, and common pool resource games. Participants in these experiments have the opportunity to influence the rules of the game before they...