The existing literature on binary games with incomplete information assumes that either payoff functions or the distribution of private information are finitely parameterized to obtain point identification. In contrast, we show that, given excluded regressors, payoff functions and the...

We introduce a structural model of procurement auctions with incomplete contracts, where a procurer chooses an initial project specification endogenously. The contract between the procurer and the winner of the auction is incomplete in that the two parties may agree to adopt a new feasible...

I estimate simultaneous games with incomplete information where players' private information are median-independent of states. I show index coefficients in utility functions are point-identified under exclusion restrictions and weak conditions on the support of states, and propose a consistent...

Bidders’ risk attitudes have key implications for choices of revenue-maximizing auction formats. In ascending auctions, bid distributions do not provide information about risk preference. We infer risk attitudes using distributions of transaction prices and participation decisions in ascending...

This paper studies entry and capacity decisions by dialysis providers in the U.S. We estimate a structural model where providers make strategic continuous choices of capacities based on private information about own costs and beliefs about competitors’ behaviors. We evaluate the impact on...

Bidders’ risk attitudes have important implications for sellers seeking to maximize expected revenues. In ascending auctions, auction theory predicts bid distributions in Bayesian Nash equilibrium does not convey any information about bidders' risk preference. We propose a new approach for...