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Leddy, Mark - 2021

The cartel leniency programs developed in the U.S. and in other jurisdictions around the world have been considered …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013226389

The effectiveness of leniency programs when firms choose the degree of collusion

Emons, Winand - 2018 - Version: October 2018

An antitrust authority deters collusion using fines and a leniency program. It chooses the probability of an investigation. Firms pick the degree of collusion: The more they collude, the higher are profits, but so is the probability of detection. Firms thus trade-off higher profits against...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011919342

Rebating antitrust fines to encourage private damages actions

Emons, Winand; Lenhard, Severin - 2020 - Version: January 2020

To encourage private actions for damages in antitrust cases some jurisdictions subtract a fraction of the redress from the fine. We analyze the effectiveness of this policy. Such a rebate does not encourage settlement negotiations that would otherwise not occur. If, however, the parties settle...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012159842

Evaluating Leniency with Missing Information on Undetected Cartels : Exploring Time-Varying Policy Impacts on Cartel Duration

Zhou, Jun - 2016

detecting and deterring cartels. As a supplementary analysis, the US leniency is studied. I discuss a dynamic model of cartel … formation and dissolution to illustrate how changes in antitrust policies and economic conditions might affect cartel duration … heterogeneity of cartels and the time-varying policy impacts suggested by theory. Contrary to earlier studies, my statistical tests …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014184217

Cartel Prosecution and Leniency Programs : Corporate Versus Individual Leniency

Festerling, Philipp - 2008

cases, the individual leniency program increases the owners' tolerance for cartel activity for two reasons: Either the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014060777

Leniency programs in the presence of judicial errors

Ghebrihiwet, Nahom; Motchenkova, Evgenia - 2010

We analyze the effects of antitrust and leniency programs in a repeated oligopoly model outlined in Motta and Polo (2003). We extend their framework by including the possibility of Type I judicial errors and pre-trial settlements. Through comparison of our results to the earlier results we come...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009127993

Do leniency policies facilitate collusion? : experimental evidence

Clemens, Georg; Rau, Holger A. - 2014

-stage cartel formation experiment where multiple ringleaders may emerge. Although theory predicts that cartels will always be …This paper experimentally analyzes the cartel coordination challenge induced by the discrimination of cartel … ringleaders in leniency policies. Ringleaders often take a leading role in the coordination and formation of a cartel. A leniency …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010228272

Determinants of self-reporting under the European corporate leniency program

Hoang, Cung Truong; Hüschelrath, Kai; Laitenberger, Ulrich - 2014

in the cartelized market. Our results have important implications for an effective prosecution of anti-cartel law …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010385205

Do leniency policies facilitate collusion? : experimental evidence ; conference paper

Clemens, Georg; Rau, Holger A. - 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010487743

Self-Defeating Antitrust Laws : How Leniency Programs Solve Bertrand's Paradox and Enforce Collusion in Auctions

Spagnolo, Giancarlo - 2003

I find that current US's and EU's Antitrust laws -- in particular their "moderate" leniency programmes that only reduce or at best cancel sanctions for price-fixing firms that self-report -- may make collusion enforceable even in one-shot competitive interactions, like Bertrand oligopolies and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014151044