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In this paper, we study the impact of a merger on collusion depending on the endowment of capital asset among firms. We show that the merger makes the collusion easier to sustain when asymmetric capital stock combines with less efficient insiders because of more symmetric conditions and closer...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014217749
An antitrust authority deters collusion using fines and a leniency program. It chooses the probability of an investigation. Firms pick the degree of collusion: The more they collude, the higher are profits, but so is the probability of detection. Firms thus trade-off higher profits against...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012851094
Leniency programs reduce sanctions for law violators that self-report. I focus on their ability to deter price-fixing cartels - and organized crime in general - by increasing incentives to "cheat" on partners. Moderate leniency programs that reduce/cancel sanctions for a spontaneously reporting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014152007
We investigate the impact of cartel breakdowns on merger activity. Merging information on cartel cases decided by the … average number of all merger transactions increase by up to 51 percent when comparing the three years before the cartel … even more – by up to 83 percent – after the cartel breakdowns. Our results not only suggest that competition authorities …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009751721
. Effective private enforcement requires that cartel victims can receive (at least) full compensation for the harm suffered …. Academics and competition authorities support this goal with guidance for the calculation of cartel damages. However, they … several years until cartel victims obtain damages. Interest and inflation are thus two key drivers of adequate compensation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010233583
to a downstream price cartel. First, we show that such suppliers incur losses driven by a direct quantity, a price and a … residual demand estimation that allows to quantify all determinants of cartel suppliers’ damages, thereby showing that supplier … damage claims are a viable option in practice that can contribute to full compensation and greater cartel deterrence. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009787408
probably the most important one: suppliers to a downstream sellers’ cartel. The paper shows graphically and analytically that … cartel suppliers are negatively affected by the conspiracy depending on three effects: a direct quantity, a price and a cost … recent case law and the forthcoming Damages Directive, allows for approving cartel supplier damage claims. We argue that this …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010468358
This article provides a model of two risk-neutral firms that may cooperate to achieve a goal that is potentially illegal. The model assumes enforcement risk and firms that are imperfectly informed about antitrust law enforcement. It is shown that compliance training, which educates the agents...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010439221
Firm strategies cannot be analyzed without taking into consideration the legal framework which governs the relationships between economic agents, especially competition law. As a consequence, firms have to maneuver through a complex universe, taking account of both the rules of the economic game...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013100306
on average by 10% is much too low, and that principles of optimal deterrence indicate that current levels of cartel …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012728627