We experimentally test the efficacy of indenture as a self-enforced contract device. In an indenture game, the … games increases over time. -- Cooperation ; experiment ; contracts ; indenture ; reciprocity …

two period game, involving the choke of the contract; length by the principal and an investment choke by the agent. In … contrast to the game theoretic predictions, we find that investment of the worker and length of contract; are strictly … although the model is fully deterministic. This could imply a behaviorally relevant difference between contract and market …

We experimentally test the efficacy of indenture as a self-enforced contract device. In an indenture game, the …

We present a field experiment to assess the effect of own and peer wage variations on actual work effort of employees … additional real-effort laboratory experiment we show that explicit cost and surplus information that enables to exactly calculate … employer's surplus from the work contract is a crucial prerequisite for a positive wage-effort relation. This demonstrates that …

We present a field experiment to assess the effect of own and peer wage variations on actual work effort of employees … additional real-effort laboratory experiment we show that explicit cost and surplus information that enables to exactly calculate … employer's surplus from the work contract is a crucial pre-requisite for a positive wage-effort relation. This demonstrates …

value of the employer reputation system for workers, employers, and the market. Specifically, in an experiment that varies … reputation serves as a collateral against opportunism in the absence of contract enforcement …

observed in the experiment aim at fair surplus sharing. -- principal-agent theory ; contract theory ; fair sharing ; incentive … the terms of the contract. However, in contrast with economic predictions, we find that agents (i) reject 'unfair … contracts' and that (ii) given acceptance, their effort choices are to some extent driven by reciprocity. It seems that contract …

We study behavior within a simple principal-agent experiment. Our design allows for a large class of linear contracts …