Telemonitoring devices can be used to screen consumer characteristics and mitigate information asymmetries that lead to adverse selection in insurance markets. Nevertheless, some consumers value their privacy and dislike sharing private information with insurers. In a second-best efficient...

In our main article, Miura and Yamashita (2014) ("On the possibility of information transmission"), we have shown in a cheap-talk environment that "assuming full revelation in a common-knowledge environment" implies a very different conclusion for models with slight misspeci fication in the...

We exploit contract-level data from Bosnia and Herzegovina to assess the impact of a new credit registry on the use of borrower collateral versus third-party guarantees. Among first-time borrowers, the introduction of mandatory information sharing leads to a shift from collateral to guarantees,...

This paper studies information sharing between strategic investors who are privately informed about asset fundamental with different precision levels. We find that a coarsely informed investor would always share her information “as is” if her counterparty investor is well informed about the...

This paper studies a multiple-receiver Bayesian persuasion model, where a sender communicates with receivers who have homogeneous beliefs and aligned preferences. The sender wants to implement a proposal and commits to a communication strat- egy which sends private (possibly) correlated messages...

Firms and other institutions frequently evaluate their employees. Some firms ask for their employees to complete self-evaluation reports (SERs). The consensus in the business literature is that SERs are not credible and should only be used as a developmental tool. I discuss when SERs are useful...

Digital platforms facilitate interactions between consumers and merchants that allow collection of profiling information, which drives innovation and welfare. Private incentives, however, lead to information asymmetries resulting in market failures both on-platform, among merchants, and...

We study third-degree price discrimination in the presence of uninformed buyers who extract noisy information from observing prices. In a noisy learning environment, price discrimination can be detrimental to the firm and beneficial to the consumers. On the one hand, discriminatory pricing...

The trade-off between the costs and benefits of disclosing a firm's private information has been the object of a vast literature. The absence of incentives to share information on a common market demand prior to competition has been advocated to interpret information sharing as evidence of...

We study information transmission between informed experts and an uninformed decision-maker who only takes binary decisions. In the single expert case, we show that information transmission can only be relatively poor. Hence, even sophiscated communication games do not yield equilibria which (ex...