We consider a quantity-location duopoly game in a spatial discrimination model in which we assume that the delivered goods can be imperfect substitutes or complements. The paper extends the analysis by Shimizu [Economics Letters 76 (2002)] who provides arguments to exclude the possibility for...

The aim of this paper is to revise and correct the results obtained in Beladi et al. [Beladi, H., Chakrabarti, A., Marjit, S., 2010. Cross-border merger, vertical structure, and spatial competition. Economics Letters 109, 112-114]. Specifically, we prove that the Nash equilibrium locations of...

For the purpose of explaining interindustry variation in the geographic distribution of firms, this article explores the impact of product heterogeneity on the incentives for firms to cluster in the presence of a ubiquitous "periphery" of stand-alone firms. Our analysis revolves around two...

Endogenous firm location is analyzed in a discrete two-region-two-firm model of product differentiation. In a non-cooperative game, two regional governments first decide on the imposition (or lifting) of domestic production standards; firms then choose technology (clean or polluting), location...

We extend the well-known spatial competition model (d'Aspremont et al., 1979) to a continuous time model in which two firms compete in each instance. Our focus is on the entry timing decisions of firms and their optimal locations. We demonstrate that the leader has an incentive to locate closer...

We investigate the entry timing and location decisions under market-size uncertainty with Brownian motions in a continuous-time spatial competition duopoly model a la d'Aspremont et al. (1979). Under a sequential equilibrium, the threshold of the follower non-monotonically increases in...

In this paper, we adopt the vertical differentiation duopoly framework to give a full description of firms' relocation decisions, when the removal either of trade barriers or of restrictions on capital outflows/inflows (globalization) allows them to serve the domestic market through foreign...

We provide a simple model to investigate decisions on vertical integration/separation. The key feature of this model is that more than one input is required for the final products of the local downstream monopolists. Depending on their cost structure, downstream firms' decisions on vertical...