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Incentive contracts and elections for politicians with multi-task problems

Gersbach, Hans; Liessem, Verena - 2004

We consider a model with a politician facing a multi-task problem while in office. The reelection mechanism distorts the allocation of effort in favor of tasks whose outcomes can be measured more precisely than others. We show that a hierarchy of elections and incentive contracts can alleviate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014145815

Mechanisms for efficient voting with private information about preferences

Engelmann, Dirk; Grimm, Veronika - 2008

We experimentally study behavior in a simple voting game where players have private information about their preferences. With random matching, subjects overwhelmingly follow the dominant strategy to exaggerate their preferences, which leads to inefficiency. We analyze an exogenous linking...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003894591

Public goods and voting on formal sanction schemes : an experiment

Putterman, Louis G.; Tyran, Jean-Robert; Kamei, Kenju - 2010

, and of gender and intelligence. -- Public good ; voluntary contribution ; formal sanction ; experiment ; penalty ; voting …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008688959

An experimental study of voting with costly delay

Kwiek, Maksymilian; Marreiros, Helia; Vlassopoulos, Michael - 2015

A conclave is a voting mechanism in which a committee selects an alternative by voting until a sufficient supermajority is reached. We study experimentally welfare properties of simple three-voter conclaves with privately known preferences over two outcomes and waiting costs. The resulting game...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011336977

The Effect of Voting on Contributions in a Public Goods Game

le Sage, Sander - 2015

This paper reports the results of a public good experiment with voting. The standard game in which subjects decide …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013017455

Public Goods and Voting on Formal Sanction Schemes : An Experiment

Putterman, Louis - 2010

The burgeoning literature on the use of sanctions to support public goods provision has largely neglected the use of formal or centralized sanctions. We let subjects playing a linear public goods game vote on the parameters of a formal sanction scheme capable both of resolving and of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013149142

Other-regarding preferences, group identity and political participation : an experiment

Robalo, Pedro; Schram, Arthur; Sonnemans, Joep - 2013

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010191396

Public Goods and Voting on Formal Sanction Schemes : An Experiment

Putterman, Louis; Tyran, Jean-Robert; Kamei, Kenju - 2010

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014199163

When Do Conflicting Parties Share Political Power? An Experimental Study

Battaglini, Marco; Mechtenberg, Lydia - 2014

We conduct a laboratory experiment to study the incentives of a privileged group to share political power with another … yellows collectively choose the voting rule for a general election: a simple majority rule that favors them, or a proportional … of the election, or after the choice of the electoral rule, but before the election. We find that the yellow group shares …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014149190

Voting Game Experiments with Incomplete Information : A Survey

Großer, Jens - 2018

This chapter surveys voting game experiments that involve incomplete information with regard to voters’ opinions about what the best course of action might be and characteristics, especially their private costs and benefits related to decision making and their group affiliations (i.e., which...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014110217